• observe the world and things in the world
• perform experiments
• formulate generalizations (hypotheses) and test them against known facts and further experiments
• compare the results of our experiments with the results obtained by others
• refine our hypothesis
• formulate scientific laws and theories.

 Philosophy seems to be much more speculative. Philosophical questions do not seem to be solved by performing empirical experiments.

One way to understand philosophy, typical for Western tradition, is to treat it as an academic discipline identified by its nethod and sub-fields. Here are some branches (or subfields) of Philosophy:

Metaphysics Epistemology Ethics Aesthetics

Philosophical Anthropology Philosophical Theology (Philosophy of God and Religion) History of Philosophy

Philosophy of law Philosophy of language Philosophy of mathematics, etc. Philosophy of science

Geographical Points

The area of Texas is 267,338 square miles. The population of Texas is 18, 378, 000 people. The area of Germany is 137.838 square miles.

The population of Germany is 78, 350, 000 people. The area of Poland is 120,727 square miles. The population of Poland is 38, 300, 000 people.

An Astronomical Point

• There are black holes in the Universe. 
• The known universe is about 15 000 000 000 years old

Some Examples of Historical Points

• Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca was first to land on the Texas coast in 1528.
• Texas joined the United States in 1845.

SOME EXAMPLES OF PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS

The Cosmological Argument (for the Existence of God)	The Argument from Evil (against God's existence)
There is world. If there is world, someone must have created it. Only God could have created the world. Therefore, God exists. [from (1)-(3)]	If God exists, then this world was created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (OO&O) being. If this world was created by an OO&O being, then this world contains nothing bad. This world contains somethin bad things some superfluous evil. Therefore, God does not exist. [from (1)-(3)]

Each of these argument is VALID, but at most, only one of them is sound.

 VALIDITY: An argument is valid if and only if (hereafter, iff) iits clonusion follows from the premises.
In other words, necessarily, if the premises of a valid argument are all true, then so is its conclusion; the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion.

For example:
1) All Texans wear 10 gallon hats.
2) Gandhi was a Texan.
3) Gandhi was wearing a 10 gallon hat. [from (1) and (2)]

SOUNDNESS: If an argument is valid and has all true premises, then it is SOUND.

For example:
1) All people (persons) are mortal.
2) Gandhi was a person.
3) Gandhi was mortal. [from (1) and (2)]

This outline covers the issues of validity and soundness in greater length.

An anti-skeptical argument	A skeptical argument
1. Stef had very apple-ish sensations this morning while eating breakfast. 2. If Stef had such sensations, then he knew he had an apple for breakfast. 3. Therefore, Stef knew he had an apple for breakfast [from (1) and (2)]	If someone knows something, then she has certainty about it. No one is ever certain of anything. Therefore, No one knows anything. [from (1) and (2)]

An argument from choice for freedom	An argument from determinism against freedom
Sometimes we do what we choose to do. If sometimes we do what we choose to do, then sometimes we act freely. Therefore, sometimes we act freely (we have free will). [from (1) and (2)]	1. All human actions are caused. 2. If all human actions are caused, then no action is free. 3. Therefore, no action is free (we have no free will). [from (1) and (2)]

SOME EXAMPLES OF ETHICAL ARGUMENTS

An Argument About Cultural Relativism

1. "Right" means "approved in a certain society".
2. The extermination of Jews was socially approved in the Nazi Germany.
3. Thus, the extermination of Jews was right. [From (1) and (2)]

An Argument About Utilitarianism

1. If utilitarianism is true, then it is always morally permissible to sacrifice innocent people whenever it benefits the society.
2. Sometimes it is wrong to sacrifice innocent people even if it benefits society.
3. Therefore, utilitarianism is false. [From (1) and (2)]

 An Argument About Euthanasia and Suicide

1. All rational acts that do not harm anyone are morally permissible.
2. Euthanasia and suicide are rational and they do not harm anyone.
3. Thus, they are morally permissible. [From (1) and (2)]

• Descriptive
  • anthropology
  • sociology
  • psychology
• Moral Philosophy
  • metaethics
  • normative ethics
    • ethical theory
    • applied ethics

DESCRIPTIVE ETHICS: An empirical study of moral customs, convictions, and motivations; it's a domain of anthropology, sociology, psychology; etc.; it is not part of (moral) philosophy. Notice, the claims above describe the beliefs of various people or groups. They do not tell us what is right or wrong but merely what those people think about right and wrong.

DESCRIPTIONS OF MORALITY vs. MORAL JUDGMENTS

DESCRIPTIVE ETHICS	(EVALUATIONS) APPLIED ETHICS
According to Eskimos (they think that), it is all right when older people die from starvation.	When they are too big a burden, it may be permissible let older people die from starvation.
Hopi Indians allow small animals to suffer, they think it is permissible.	It is morally permissible (all right) when small animals suffer.
Doctors think that deception is permissible.	Deception is permissible.
Roman Catholics oppose abortion and suicide.	Abortions and suicide are morally wrong.
Some (perhaps most) Christians object to gay sex and marriages.	One must not have sexual relations, and must not marry, with people of the same sex.
Women are more compassionate than men.	Nurses ought to be compassionate

In general, questions about what people think, believe or claim about morality

• are part of descriptive ethics
• but are not part of moral philosophy.

Questions about what moral beliefs are true or justified

• are not part of descriptive ethics
• they are part of moral philosophy

METAETHICS: A philosophical study of the meaning, nature and methodology of moral judgments and terms, relations between moral concepts, the correct ways of arguing about moral issues, similarities and differences between various normative systems (e.g., morality, religion, law, etiquette, aesthetics, the requirements of prudence, the judgments of taste), etc.

Some approximations of the meaning of moral terms:

• Morally obligatory: something you ought to, or must, do from a moral point of view.
• Morally permissible: it is OK to do this, it's all right from a moral point of view
• Morally forbidden: it is morally wrong, should not be done, unacceptable from a moral point of view.

Some metaethics definitions and principles (usually, they display relations between various moral concepts):

• (D1) An act is obligatory =df. it is not permissible to fail to do this act.
• (D2) An act is morally forbidden =df. it is not morally permissible to do his act.
• "A Man Has To Do What Man Has To Do": If someone ought to do a, and she cannot do a without doing b, then she ought to do b.
• A Conjunction of Obligations: If a person ought to do an act a, and she ought to do another act b, then she ought to do both a and b.
• 'Ought' Entails 'Can': A person ought to do an act a only if she can do a. If she cannot do a, then it is not obligatory for her to do a.

NORMATIVE ETHICS

ETHICAL THEORY (THEORETICAL ETHICS)

• What are the most fundamental moral principles (standards)?
• What principles ought we to live by?
• How to formulate these standards in an exact and precise way?

APPLIED/PRACTICAL ETHICS

• medical ethics (e.g., it's wrong for doctors to deceive their patients; passive euthanasia is sometimes permissible)
• business ethics (lying and deception is permissible in business contexts)
• environmental ethics (it's morally wrong to exterminate rare species of animals and plants; raising animals in factory farms is morally wrong)
• ethics in education, etc. (teachers ought to provide their students with the access to information)

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WHAT IS MORALITY
Philosophers struggle trying to define morality or to explain what counts as a moral judgment. In the lectures to which this outline corresponds we have addressed several different ways to answer this question . The first three are considered, and rejected, by Fred Feldman, in the introductory chapter to his book, Introduction to Ethics (Prentice Hall, 1978, pp. 1-11).

M1: An English sentence expresses a moral judgment if and only if it contains a value term.

The motivation behind this account. Ethics (morality) is normative (and not just descriptive). That is

• Moral judgments express norms.
• They do not just describe reality.
• They tell us what is right and wrong
• what we ought to do
• what is permissible
• what is forbidden
• and so on...

To evaluate this principle, let us assume that such terms as right, wrong, obligatory, required, ought to, good, bad, wicked, virtuous, and so on are all value terms. (Notice, some of them are used to evaluate or prescribe actions; others to evaluate situations and outcomes; others to evaluate humans and their character. The evaluation of actions, situation, and humans are three main areas of ethical inquiry.)

M1 allows us to distinguish moral judgments from purely descriptive claims:

The above constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of M1.

Here is a general form for the reductio arguments.

0) Assume that P (an assumption for reductio).
1) If P, then Q.
2) But, not Q.
3) Therefore, not P.

An example: Consider the claim that smoking pot is wrong because it alters our minds.

1) If doing what alters our minds is wrong, then drinking beer is wrong.
2) But drinking beer is not wrong.
3) Therefore, it is not (always) wrong to do what alters our minds

To wit: smoking pot is not wrong simply because it alters our minds. There may be, however, other reasons why it is wrong.

Another Example: Assume that someone maintains that all wars are wrong because all killings are wrong.

1) If all killings are wrong, then killing in necessary self-defense is also wrong.
2) But killing in necessary self-defense is not wrong.
3) Therefore, it's not the case that all killing are wrong (some killings are not wrong).

M2: An English sentence expresses a moral judgment if and only if it is about some moral issue.
M2 allows us to distinguish some moral norms from many norms that are not moral norms. E.g.: the following judgments do not express moral norms:

(9) When rebuilding my engine, I put in the timing gears all wrong.
(10) If you want larger yields, you ought to use more fertilizer.
(11) He turned right at the corner.
(12) The acting was good, but the lighting was bad.

Unfortunately, many judgments that are about moral issues are not in fact moral judgments. Here are some examples:

(13) Abortion is illegal in some places.
(14) Suicide occurs more frequently during economic depressions.
(15) People sometimes request euthanasia for themselves.
(16) Vigorous sexual activity can be good exercise.

M3: An English sentence expresses a moral judgment for a society if and only if (i) it is about a moral custom of that society, and (ii) it contains a value term.
M3 can be treated as a an attempt to combine M1 and M2. It borrows from M1 the concept of value term. It is also somehow similar to M2. It does not use the concept of a moral issue, but it uses a somehow related concept of a moral custom. Feldman attributes this sort of account to John Hartland-Swann, who tried to distinguish three different kinds of customs. As Feldman observes:

Among these customs, some are considered by members of the society to be of very great "social importance." To violate a custom of very great social importance is to threaten the very existence of the society. For example, in our society we have the custom of, in general, not stabbing our neighbors when they annoy us. If we began to violate this custom, the whole fabric of our society might begin unravel. Other customs are viewed as being of intermediate social importance – for example, the custom of keeping our promises. Finally, some customs are viewed as being of very slight social importance. In our society, a custom of this sort would be that of shaking hands with another person when we are introduced.
According to this view, each sort of custom is associated with a sort of punishment. If you violate a custom, your punishment should be of the appropriate degree of severity. Thus, if you violate a custom of very great social importance, you may be fined, sent to prison, or even executed. If you violate a custom of intermediate social importance, your fellow citizens may reproach you or give you the cold shoulder-they will let you know that they think you have behaved poorly. Finally, if you violate a custom of slight social importance, you will be held up to slight condemnation. People may kid you about your gracelessness, or laugh at you.

The main idea of M3 is that moral judgments are associated with the customs of intermediate social importance.
Again, M3 is false. For we frequently make moral judgments about the customs of great social importance as well as about the customs of very slight social importance. Here are some examples:

SHAW'S ACCOUNT OF MORALITY
William Shaw offers two additional characteristics of morality. He observes, first, that:

Moral standards ... concern behavior that is of serious consequence to human welfare, that can profoundly injure or benefit people. The conventional moral norms against lying, stealing, and murdering deal with actions that can hurt people. And the moral principle that human beings should be treated with dignity and respect uplifts the human personality. Whether products are healthful or harmful, work conditions safe or dangerous, personnel procedures biased or fair, privacy respected or invaded are also matters that seriously affect human well-being. The standards that govern our conduct in these areas are moral standards.
A second characteristic follows from the first. Moral standards take priority over other standards, including self-interest. Something that morality condemns-for instance, the burglary of your neighbor’s home-cannot be justified on the nonmoral grounds that it would be a thrill to do it or that it would payoff handsomely. We take moral standards to be more important than other considerations in guiding our actions.
A third characteristic of moral standards is that their soundness depends on the adequacy of the reasons that support or justify them. For the most part, fashion standards are set by clothing designers, merchandisers, and consumers; grammatical standards by grammarians and students of language; technical standards by practitioners and experts in the field. Legislators make laws, boards of directors make organizational policy, and licensing boards establish standards for professionals. In every case, some authoritative body is the ultimate validating source of the standards and thus can change the standards if it wishes. Moral standards are not made by such bodies, although they are often endorsed or rejected by them. More precisely, the validity of moral standards depends not on authoritative fiat but on the adequacy of the reasons that support or justify them. Precisely what constitutes adequate reasons for moral standards is problematic and, as we shall see, underlies disagreement about the legitimacy of specific moral principles.

It seems that he might endorse the following:

M(Shaw) An English sentence expresses a (valid) moral standard iff
1) this standard concern behavior of serious consequence to human welfare;
2) it is especially important (overriding);
3) it is supported by good reasons.

But there are problems with this principle, too. First, some moral judgments seem to have nothing to do with human welfare. Environmental ethics deals with some of such judgments.
Second, some overriding judgments do not seem to be moral judgments. Someone may believe the following

(?) One ought to shower and brush one's teeth in the morning.

(?) seems to deal with human welfare and also it seems to be especially important. In fact, under certain circumstances, it may be the most important thing to do. For example, when you wake up in the morning you may think that talking a shower and brushing teeth is more important (should be done before), say, doing yoga, eating breakfast, or calling your mother. So, you rank your obligations as follows:

• shower and brush your teeth in the morning.
• do yoga
• have breakfast
• call your mother

But (?) does not seem to be a moral judgments. In fact an obligation to call one's mother seems to be the only moral requirement. So, there are reasons to doubt that moral judgments are always overriding.

It seems correct to suppose that valid moral judgments must be supported by good reasons.

STEF'S VIEW ABOUT MORALITY

M(Stef) A society (or an individual) treats some normative judgment as a moral judgment if
this society (individual) is willing to reward (punish) acting in accordance with (or contrary to) this judgment with appropriate internal and external sanctions.

On this account, moral judgments are just those judgments that are associated (by an agent, or a society) with moral sanctions. Internal sanctions that accompany morality are feelings analogous to guilt, shame, pride. External sanctions are the rewards and punishments administered by a society, e.g., the anger of others or even ostracism.
I agree that valid (or correct) moral judgments and principles must be supported by good reasons. Ideally, on my view, they should be parts of a fully rational moral system.

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MORALITY AS A NORMATIVE SYSTEM

COMPLETENESS

A moral code (moral rules) must provide a prescription for every morally important situation.

AN IDEAL MORAL SYSTEM MUST BE CONSISTENT

A moral code must not provide incompatible prescriptions for any situation.
Here are some examples of inconsistent views.

ARGUMENT A	ARGUMENT A*
1) All killings are morally wrong. 2) Charles Manson killed several people. 3) Therefore, Charles Manson did something morally wrong. [from (1) and (2)]	1*) All killings are morally wrong. 2*) A fisherman killed a fish. 3*) Therefore, a fisherman did something morally wrong. [from (1*) and (2*)]

ARGUMENT B	ARGUMENT B*
1)All acts that kill a person are morally wrong. 2) Charles Manson killed several people. 3) Therefore, Charles Manson did something morally wrong. [from (1) and (2)]	1*) All acts that kill a person are morally wrong. 2*) A policeman killed a terrorist 3*) Therefore, a policeman did something morally wrong. [from (1*) and (2*)]

ARGUMENT  C

1. All acts involving intentional killings of innocent persons are morally wrong.
2. Charles Manson killed intentionally several innocent people.
3. Therefore, Charles Manson did something morally wrong. [from (1) and (2)]

 

ARGUMENT D	ARGUMENT D*
1) All deception is morally wrong. 2) Doctors deceive people. 3) Therefore, they do something morally wrong. [from (1) and (2)]	1) All deception is morally wrong. 2) Care salesmen deceive people. 3) Therefore, they do something morally wrong. [from (1) and (2)]

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MORALITY DIFFERS FROM THE LAW

• They are not extensionally equivalent. Some moral requirements/permissions are not legal requirements/permissions. Some legal requirements/permissions are not moral requirements/permissions.
• They seem to have different origins and are based on different authority. Morality is not supported by any formal civic authority or judicial body (like state or the judicial system). We discover (or decide about) moral principles by simply reasoning about them. 
• They have different internal and external sanctions (rewards and punishments). Morality comes with particularly strong internal sanctions, the law has none. The law has very strong external sanctions (e.g., prison terms). 
• They are applicable to different people or groups of people. Morality seems to be more universal (applicable to all rational beings) than law. [However, moral relativists challenge the claim that morality is universal.]

 WHY SHOULD MORALITY AND LAW BE SEPARATE

• Morality and laws distribute different sanctions.
• Adopting certain laws is/would be irrational.
• The social costs of having these laws are/would be exceedingly high. For example, it might be too costly and thus irrational to use legal sanction to punish moral offenders. Laws must benefit the society. 
• Morality also must bring benefits to the society. but it does it in a different way than the laws do.  

MORALITY DIFFERS FROM RELIGION

• They are not extensionally equivalent. Some moral requirements/permissions are not religious requirements/permissions. Some religious requirements/permissions are not moral requirements/permissions. 
• They have different origins and authority. Religion is supposed to be based on some divine authority (e.g., the Holy Book, the special group people who interpret this book, etc.). Without revelation we cannot discover religious obligations. Religion requires faith.
•  They have different internal and external sanctions. They are applicable to different beings. Morality seems to be more universal than any religion can be. 

WHY IS MORALITY AND RELIGION SEPARATE

• Religion is based on faith, not on evidence.
• Religion's source is a religious authority; only those who accept that authority find religion binding.
• If morality is to be universal (applicable to all rational beings), we cannot base it on religion or faith.
• We cannot expect that every rational being would subscribe to the same religious requirements (will share the same faith). 

CULTS VS. UNIVERSAL ("LEGITIMATE") RELIGIONS

Universal religions respect and preserve autonomy of people. Cults do not.
Universal religions do not require acting contrary to morality or reason (common sense).
Frequently, religious cults require people to do things which are both immoral and irrational.

OVERLAP BETWEEN VARIOUS NORMATIVE SYSTEMS

MORALITY AND OTHER NORMATIVE SYSTEMS: SOME COMPARISONS

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Environmental Ethics

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