A) EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY
rationality of beliefs, judgments, theories. They must be supported by good evidence.

• Ex1: Someone looks at a piece of paper that looks white, and believes this piece of paper is white.
• Ex2: A scientists makes several experiments and concludes that water boils in the temperature of 100 C.
• Non-ex3: Someone who does not know Stef at all, in particular does not know his culinary preferences, thinks that he had a banana for breakfast.

B) PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
rationality of actions.

• Ex1: Someone takes long walks on a beach because it pleases her
• Non-Ex2: Someone cuts off his hand because he feels like doing it.

Morally required actions must not be irrational, contrary to reason (or, "stupid').
The distribution of moral sanctions also must be rational.

REGAN ON ETHICAL THEORY
Regan focuses on epistemic justification for moral judgments and principles.

He proposes six conditions that an ideal moral judgment must fulfill:

• conceptual clarity
• information
• rationality
• impartiality
• coolness
• use of valid moral principles.

He also proposes four conditions that an ideal moral principle must fulfill:

• consistency
• adequacy of scope
• precision
• conformity with our moral intuitions.

We could slightly simplify his view by combining the above conditions into the following four. Moral judgments (principles, codes, theories) must be

• conceptually clear and precise
• internally consistent (including following the formal principle of justice)
• consistent with known facts
• satisfy the criterion of reflective equilibrium

CONCEPTUAL CLARITY

Example 1: To evaluate the claim that euthanasia is always wrong, we must understand what counts as euthanasia.
Here is a plausible definition: "Euthanasia is a merciful and compassionate killing (or letting die) of someone who is terminally ill and suffers terribly .

Example 2: To evaluate the claim that abortion is always wrong because it involves killing a person, we must understand what counts as a person.
The following definitions are adopted from Oxford English Dictionary, Collier’s Encyclopedia, and New Catholic Encyclopedia

• Biological sense: An individual human being; e.g., a man, a woman, or a child.
• General Philosophical Sense: A self-conscious and rational being; e.g., a normal human being, God, an angel.
• Legal Sense: A human being (natural person) or body corporate or corporation (artificial person) having rights and duties recognized by law.
• Moral sense: a being with a special moral status protected by the rule prohibiting murder

Each of the above definitions displays one of the meanings of the word person.

Notice that the different concepts of person are not extensionally equivalent. So, someone may be a person in one sense but not in another sense. For example, small babies are persons in a biological sense, but not in a general philosophical sense.

CONSISTENCY

A moral code must not provide incompatible prescriptions for any situation. A moral view must not include contradictions.

Here are some examples of inconsistent views.

ARGUMENT A	ARGUMENT A*
1) All killings are morally wrong. 2) Charles Manson killed several people. 3) Therefore, Charles Manson did something morally wrong. [from (1) and (2)]	1) All killings are morally wrong. 2*) A fisherman killed a fish. 3*) Therefore, a fisherman did something morally wrong. [from (1*) and (2*)]

If you accept 3) because you accept 1) but then you reject 3*), then you view is INCONSISTENT. One way to remove this inconsistency is to revise (1).

ARGUMENT B	ARGUMENT B*
1b)All acts that kill a person are morally wrong. 2b) Charles Manson killed several people. 3b) Therefore, Charles Manson did something morally wrong. [from (1) and (2)]	1b) All acts that kill a person are morally wrong. 2b*) A policeman killed a terrorist 3b*) Therefore, a policeman did something morally wrong. [from (1*) and (2*)]

Again, if you reject (3b*) you must reject 1b). To be consistent, you cannot use 1b) in an argument that Manson did something wrong.

ARGUMENT  C
1c) All acts involving intentional killings of innocent persons are morally wrong.
2c) Charles Manson killed intentionally several innocent people.
3c) Therefore, Charles Manson did something morally wrong. [from (1) and (2)]

Argument "C" is much better than arguments "B," or "A." Still, if someone believes that active euthanasia is sometimes permissible, then this person must reject (1c).

ARGUMENT D	ARGUMENT D*
1) All deception is morally wrong. 2) Doctors deceive people. 3) Therefore, they do something morally wrong. [from (1) and (2)]	1) All deception is morally wrong. 2) Care salesmen deceive people. 3) Therefore, they do something morally wrong. [from (1) and (2)]

Again, if all deceptions are wrong, then both doctors and salesmen who deceive do something wrong.

MORAL VIEWS MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH KNOWN FACTS

Example 1: Suppose that someone argues as follows:

1) All murderers ought to be punished.
2) Mahatma Gandhi is a murderer
3) Mahatma Gandhi ought to be punished.

It is a bad argument. Premise (2) is false and unjustified. Hence, its conclusion (3) is also unjustified.

Example 2 (Regan's example).
Suppose that someone claims that capital punishment is right because if a convicted murderer is not executed he may likely be released and commit more crimes.
Regan maintains that, to evaluate this claim we need to know whether it is a fact that murderers are likely to be released and commit more crimes.

In addition (Stef adds): to fully asses CP we should also know other facts; e.g.,
how many innocent people are killed when we have CP;
do we administer it fairly
how much more expensive is CP comparing to the life in prison.

Coolness seems to be a way to maximize that we we ascertain all relevant facts.

REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM

Moral judgments (intuitions about cases) must confirm with valid moral principles.
Moral principles must conform with our moral intuitions about cases.
If there is no such fit, adjust your intuitions and/or principles until they fit (cohere) with each other

PRACTICAL RATIONALITY

 TWO POPULAR (BUT MISTAKEN) VIEWS

(Prudential Theory of Rationality) An action is rational if and only if it promotes one's self-interest.

• The problem for this view is that it counts all acts of self-sacrifice as irrational. For example, when parents do something for their children (but not for themselves) this view would count such behavior as irrational

(Humean /Instrumental Theory of Rationality) An action is rational insofar as it provides efficient means to one's chosen end.

• The problem for this view is that it does not guarantee that we chose our goals rationally. For example, someone who has self-destructive goals and achieves these goals would, on this view, act rationally.

PRACTICAL RATIONALITY - STEF'S VIEW

Here is an approximation of what I think: someone's acts rationally (his or her action is rationally permissible if one of the following conditions obtains:

1) one does no harm / hurt oneself and others he/she cares about, or
2) in cases someone causes some harm, he/she has an adequate reason for causing this harm.

This approximation requires some honing. In particular, we need to clarify what counts as a harm and benefit and also what counts as a reason that is adequate.

There will be some gray areas here, but (I hope) they will not be very large.

A theory of rationality that develops these ideas has been proposed by Professor Bernard Gert (link).

MORALITY MUST BE PRACTICALLY RATIONAL

Moral actions must be rational in the above sense

When we distribute moral sanctions (rewards and punishments), we must also do it in a rational manner.