The Principle of Universal Event Causation (UCe): Every event, including every action, is caused by some preceding event (or combination of events).

The Free Will Principle (FW): Sometimes people act freely (some actions are freely done).

The Principle of Incompatibilism (I): (UCe) and (FW) are incompatible. They cannot be both true. One of them is. (Free actions are not determined; actions which are determined are not free.)

The Claim About Responsibility (R): Sometimes people are responsible for what they do.

Freedom, Responsibility, and Control (FRC): We are responsible for all and only those actions that we do freely. That is, we are responsible for all and only those actions that are truly in our control.

ARGUMENTS FOR INCOMPATIBILISM

1. Every event, including every act, is caused by events. (UCe)
2. If every event, including every act, is caused by events, then everything we do is completely determined by antecedent conditions.
3. If everything we do is completely determined by antecedent conditions, then we have no control over our actions.
4. If we have no control over our actions, then nobody ever acts freely.
______
5. Therefore, nobody ever acts freely; that is (FW) is false. [from (1)-(4)]

1. Sometimes people act freely. (FW)
2. If we act freely then we have a control over our actions (we can do them but we can also avoid doing them).
3. If we have a control over our acts, then these acts are not completely determined by antecedent conditions.
4. If not everything we do is completely determined by antecedent conditions, then some events are not caused.
______
5. Therefore, some events are not caused by events; that is (UCe) is false. [from (1) - (4)].

 An example:  Paul Ree as his view is explained in Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

HARD DETERMINISM (HD)

A) Every event, including every act, has a cause [(UCe) is true]
B) Causation and freedom are incompatible [(I) is true]
C) Nobody ever does anything freely. [(FW) is false.]

 SOME ARGUMENTS AGAINST HD

 Argument from Drive Resistance (see Ree, p. 8)
1. Sometimes we resist our passions.
2. If sometimes we resist our passions, then sometimes we act freely.
3. If sometimes we are acting freely, (HD) is false.
______
4. Therefore, (HD) is false. [from (1), (2), and (3)]

Argument from Choice (see p. 9)
1. Sometimes we do what we choose to do.
2. If sometimes we do what we choose to do, then sometimes we act freely.
3. If sometimes we are acting freely, (HD) is false.
______
4. Therefore, (HD) is false. [from (1), (2), and (3)]

Argument from the Feeling of Freedom (see p. 12)
1. Sometimes we feel that we are acting freely, that we could have acted otherwise, and that nothing determine our acts.
2. If (1), then sometimes we are acting freely.
3. If sometimes we are acting freely, (HD) is false.
______
4. Therefore, (HD) is false. [from (1), (2), and (3)]

Argument from Moral Responsibility (see pp. 12-16)
1. Sometimes we are morally responsible for our actions.
2. If sometimes we are morally responsible for our actions, then sometimes we act freely.
3. If sometimes we are acting freely, (HD) is false.
______
4. Therefore, (HD) is false. [from (1), (2), and (3)]

 

 Read: Ayer, Freedom and Necessity; Chisholm, Human Freedom and the Self

EXTREME INDETERMINISM (see Ayer, p. 18; Chisholm, p. 25)

EXIND A is a free action =def. A is an action that has no cause.

Extreme Indeterminism either assumes, or is committed to, the following:
A. There are some free acts (they have no causes). [(FW) is true; (UCe) is false; (I) is true.]
B. People are morally responsible for their own free actions as well as for the consequences of those actions.

EXIND is not SD, for SD assumes that (UCe) holds.
EXIND seems to be very similar to LIB. This apparent similarity is a point of contention between determinists and libertarians.

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST EXTREME INDETERMINISM

1. If EXIND is true, then people are responsible for pure accidents (events that have no causes).
2. No one is responsible for pure accidents (for pure accidents are beyond our control).
________
3. Therefore, EXIND is not true.

MODERATE INDETERMINISM (see Ayer, p. 19; Chisholm, p. 25)

MODIND1 E is a volition =def. E is an act of choosing, deciding, or willing to do something.

MODIND2 E is a free volition =def. E is a volition that has no cause.

MODIND3 A is a freely willed action (or a free action) =def. A is an action that is caused by a free volition.

This view assumes, or is committed to, the following:
A. There are some free volitions; they are not determined, they have no causes. [UC) is false.]
B. There are some freely willed (or free) actions. [(FW) is true; (I) is true.]
C. People are morally responsible for their own freely willed actions as well as for the consequences of those actions.

 

A TYPICAL VERSION OF SOFT DETERMINISM (SD)

SD1 E is a volition =def. E is an act of choosing, deciding, or willing to do something.

SD2 E is a standard volition =def. E is a volition caused by the beliefs and desires of the agent.

SD3 A is a voluntary action =def. A is an action that is caused by a standard volition.

 SD assumes, or is committed to, the following

A. Every event, including every volition and every act, has a cause; it is caused by preceding event or series of events. [(UCe) is true.]

A more precise claim would have to allow for statistical laws and the possibility of random events. But, as we have seen, randomness does not help to solve the problem of freedom. This possibility can be put to one side.

B. There are some voluntary actions; these actions are free. [(WP) is true; (I) is false.]

C. People are responsible for their own voluntary actions as well as for the consequences of those actions.

D. Whenever a person performs a voluntary action, and is responsible for that action, she was caused to perform that action, and was unable to have done anything else instead.

(SD) is not identical with Indeterminism of any sort, for (SD) assumes (UCe).

 AN ARGUMENT AGAINST SOFT DETERMINISM (see Ayer, p. 20)

1. If SD is true, then Tom is morally responsible for killing.
2. Tom is not morally responsible for killing.
________
3. Therefore, Soft Determinism is not true. [from (1) and (2)] 

AYERIAN SOFT DETERMINISM (inspired by A.J. Ayer, p. 22)

SD4 A New Definition of Free Action. A is a properly voluntary action =def.
1. A is caused by a standard volition;
2. if the agent of A had a volition not to do A, then she would not have done A; and
3. nobody compelled the agent of A to do A.

Ayerian Soft Determinism is defined by (SD1), (SD2), (~SD3), and (SD4). Consequently, this view assumes, or is committed to, the following:

A. Every event, including every volition and every act, has a cause; it is caused by preceding event or series of events. [UC) is true.]
B. There are some properly voluntary actions; these actions are free. [(WP) is true; (I) is false.]
C. People are responsible for their own properly voluntary actions as well as for the consequences of those actions.
D. Whenever a person performs a properly voluntary action, and is responsible for that action, she was caused to perform that action, and was unable to have done anything else instead.

FREEDOM AND ABILITY TO ACT OTHERWISE

"If the man was responsible for what he did, then... what was to happen at the time of the shooting was something that was entirely up to the man himself. There was a moment at which it was true, both that he could have fired the shot and also that he could have refrained from firing it. And if this is so, even though he did fire it, he could have done something else instead. [More generally] if a man is responsible for a certain event or state of affairs..., then that event or state of affairs was brought about by some act of his, and the act was something that was in his power either to perform or not to perform. (Chisholm, p. 23)

THE AVOIDABILITY PRINCIPLE
AP If an act is free, then its agent could have done something else (could have avoided doing this act). If the act is unavoidable, then it is not free.

A PROBLEM FOR SD
Free actions must be avoidable (they must satisfy (AP)). But (SD4)-acts are not avoidable. So, (SD4) does not define free actions.

A Reply #1 (due to J. Edwards and G.E. Moore; cf. Chisholm, p. 24-25)

(SD4)-actions satisfy (AP) in the following way.

SD5 S could have avoided doing A (could have done otherwise) =def. If S had chosen to avoid doing A (to act otherwise), then S would have avoided doing A (would have done otherwise).

A Reply #2

(AP) is false. Free acts (the acts for which we are responsible) are not avoidable.

An Argument Against AP
1. If an act is blameworthy, then it is free.
2. John's act of staying in a locked room was blameworthy.
3. Therefore, John's act was free. [from (1) and (2)]
4. Yet John could not have avoided staying in the room (the room was locked).
________
5. Therefore, some acts are free but unavoidable; that is, (AP) is false. [by (3) & (4)]

TWO SORTS OF CAUSATION

D1 e₁ event-causes e₂ =def. e₁ is an event, e₁ comes before e₂, and e₁ makes e₂ happen. (e₁ ---> e₂)

D2 S agent-causes e =def. S is a person; S makes e happen; no event makes e happen. (S ===> e)

 

 THE LIBERTARIAN ACCOUNT OF FREE ACTS

L1 S did A freely =def. 1) A is an act of S; 2) no combination of events was causally sufficient for A (no event or combination of events caused A); and 3) S agent-caused A.

NEW VERSIONS OF UC AND FW

UC* Every (nonrandom) event has a cause, but some events are agent-caused (by people or other agents), and are not event-caused by anything.

FW Sometimes people act freely; they perform acts that are agent-caused by themselves.

LIBERTARIANISM

A. Accepts FW and UC*; rejects UCe.
B. Accepts R; people are morally responsible for their own agent-caused acts (that is, for their free acts), as well as for the consequences of those acts.
BASIC POSITIONS REVISED AND REVIEWED

	Agent-C	UCe	UC*	I	FW	R
HD	NO	YES (??)	NO	YES	NO	NO
SD	NO	YES (??)	NO	NO	YES	YES
IND	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
LIB	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notice: LIB is not identical with IND of any sort. LIB assumes UC* ( => free acts are caused) while IND rejects the thesis of universal causation (=> free acts are not caused).

LIB is not identical with SD of any sort either. Libertarians accept, while determinists reject, the idea of agent causation. In effect, LIB assumes UC* and rejects UCe; while SD accepts UCe and rejects UC*.

THE OBSCURANTISM OBJECTION

Agent causation is obscure, we cannot understand what it is, and we cannot attribute it to any agent.

THE PSYCHOLOGY AND TRAINING OBJECTION

1. Our actions are always caused by desires, beliefs, habits, training, upbringing, etc.
2. If (1) is true, then there are no free acts of (L1)-sort.
3. If there are no free acts of (L1)-sort, then (L1) is false.
_________________
4. Therefore, (L1) is false. [from (1), (2), and (3)]

"COULD HAVE DONE OTHERWISE" OBJECTION

1. (L1) does not state or imply that when S acts freely, S could have avoided performing this act.
2. The act is free only if it is avoidable.
_________________
3. Therefore, (L1) is false. [from (1) and (2)]

A reply: (L1), if properly understood, does imply the possibility of doing otherwise. This is the case because:

L2 S could have avoided doing A (could have done otherwise) =df No events are causally sufficient to bring about A.

PREDICTABILITY OBJECTION

1. There can be a science of man and human behavior is completely predictable.
2. If (1), then every human action has an event cause.
3. If every human action has an event cause, then libertarianism is false.
___________
4. Therefore, Libertarianism is false. [from (1), (2), and (3)]