Readings: E. Wierenga, "Divine Attributes" [H]; H.P. Owen, "Theism" [H]; P. Geach, "Omnipotence and allmightiness" [H]
SOME FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY
SOME NON-PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTIONS OF GOD
A. God is love. An Argument from Love1. Many people love and many people are loved.
2. If (1), then love exists.
3. If love exists, then God exists.
4. Therefore, God exists. [from (1), (2), and (3)]B. God is the great source of energy. An Argument from Natural Energy
1. The tides go in and out, the wind blows, volcanos erupt.
2. If (1), then there is a great source of energy in the Universe.
3. If there is such a great source of energy, then God exists.
4. Therefore, God exists. [from (1), (2), and (3)]
MONOTHEISM vs. POLYTHEISM
Monotheism: There is one God (or god)
Polytheism: There are many gods
TRADITIONAL THEISM
A. God is personal; God has mind, consciousness, will, and so on.
B. God is worthy of adoration; God is the supreme being.
C. God is separate from the world. (as opposed to pantheism)
D. God is continuously active in the world (as opposed to deism that assumes that God is the first cause of the world but is not active in the world).
A PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTION OF GOD
D1 x is God =def. x is the supreme being.
D2 x is supreme =def. x has all perfections.
D3 F is a perfection =def. F is the highest degree of a property that (A) comes in degrees; and (B) is intrinsically good to have.
SOME ALLEGED PERFECTIONS
Omnipotence: x is omnipotent =def. x can bring about any possible state of affairs.
Omniscience: x is omniscient =def. x knows everything that is true [and does not believe anything that is false].
Omnibenevolence: x is omnibenevolent =def. x never does anything wrong, does not exemplify any vices, and always prefers better to the worse.
Necessary existence: x is necessary existent =def. necessarily, for any time, t, x exists at t; and there is no time at which x can cease to exist.
Creativity: x is creative =def. all contingent things ontologically depend on x.
Incorporeality: x is incorporeal =def. x is not a physical [material] object.A Principle About God (3xO Principle)
(OOO) X is God if and only if x is the omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent (and perhaps necessarily existent, creative, and incorporeal ) being.
Read: Pascal, "Wager" [H]
SOME POSSIBLE REASONS FOR BELIEVING THAT GOD EXISTS
1. You will be happier.
2. Your life will go better.
3. Your life will have meaning.
4. You will avoid the risk of Hell.
5. You will gain the chance of Heaven.
PASCAL'S WAGER
1. Everyone has good reason to believe that God exists.
2. If everyone has good reason to believe that God exists, then (most likely) God exists.
3. Therefore, (most likely) God exists.
TWO SENSES OF 'GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE'
Prudential Sense: A person, S, has a reasonp for believing that some statement (proposition) p is true =def. S will be better off when she believes that p is true [for S, to hold belief p better advances S's interests, than not holding this belief].(Ex1) Mark believes that Mary never goes out with other guys.
(Ex2) A person whose airplane got wrecked in the Arctic sea believes that she will survive.
(Ex3) Dariusz believes that the Universe is inhabited by lots of different intelligent beings.Evidential Sense: A person, S, has a reasone for believing some proposition p =def. S has a proof, or strong evidence, that p is true.
(Ex1) Mary believes that people like her.
(Ex2) Jana believes that she has beautiful black eyes.
(Ex3) Stefan believes that he drives a Toyota.
Read: "The Vatican Position Evolves" (Science 274, November 1, 1996)
THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE
P1. The Bible says that God exists.
P2. What the Bible says is true.
_______
C. God exists [from (P1), and (P2)]The Question Begging Interpretation of the AFS
1. What the Bible says is the inspired word of God.
2. Whatever is the inspired word of God is true.
________
Therefore, what the Bible says is true.The Inductive Generalization of the Argument from Scripture
An Example of Inductive Argument
1. The first emerald is green.
2. The second emerald is green.
3. The n-th emerald is green.
________
Therefore, probably, every emerald is green.Another Example of Inductive Argument
1. The statement #1 from the Bible is true.
2. The statement #2 from the Bible is true.
n. The statement #n from the Bible is true.
________
Therefore, probably, every statement in the Bible is true.The Third Example of Inductive Argument
1. The statement #1 from the Bible is about (describes) natural world and is true.
2. The statement #2 from the Bible is about natural world and is true.
n. The statement #n from the Bible is about natural world and is true.
________
Therefore, probably, every statement in the Bible is true.
THE ARGUMENT FROM NATURAL PROCESSES
1. Everything in the universe is a natural thing, a result of some natural process.
2. If (1), then God does not exist.
_______
Therefore, God does not exist.
Read: Paley, The Watch and The Human Eye
PALEY'S ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN
0. Inductive basis: There are various things that exhibit design (i.e., they exhibit high-organization, and complexity), and are in fact intelligently designed.
_________
Inductive step -- probably
1. Everything that exhibits design was in fact intelligently designed.
2. The Universe exhibits design.
_________
3. Therefore, the Universe was intelligently designed. [from (1) and (2)]
4. Only God could intelligently design the Universe.
_________
5. Therefore, God exists.
HUME OBJECTIONS
A conclusion cannot be transferred from a part to the whole: Our only evidence that the Universe exhibits design is based on our examination of only part of it.No inductive reasoning can establish a conclusion about a unique object: The Universe is unique. So, we cannot know anything about the Universe.
REPLIES TO HUME OBJECTIONS
Reply #1: Neither objection is very good. Science does just what (I) and (II) claim cannot be done.Reply #2: Both objections are sidestepped by the following modification of Paley’s argument:
1. Everything that exhibits design was in fact intelligently designed.
2a. Various parts of the Universe exhibit design.
_________
3a. Therefore, various parts of the Universe were intelligently designed. [from (1) and (2a)]
4a. Only God could intelligently designed these parts of Universe.
_________5. Therefore, God exists. [from (3a) and (4a)]
HUME'S THIRD (AND BEST) OBJECTION
The weaker the analogy the weaker the conclusion: The analogy between the Universe and other things that exhibit high-organization, complexity, and design is too weak to support the conclusion that the Universe (or its parts) was/were intelligently designed.
THE BEST OBJECTION TO PALEY
Suppose that, indeed, the following is established:A. The Universe (or at least its parts) was designed.Consider now the following propositions:
B. The Universe was designed by exactly one person.
C. The Universe was created ex nihilo.
D. The Universe was created by the being who designed it.
E. The creator of the Universe is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
F. The creator of the Universe is an eternal spirit, without body, and in no way dependent upon physical objects.
Given the premises of the argument, the denial of {B, C, D, E, F} is at least as likely as {B, C, D, E, F} is. Therefore, the premises of the argument do not confirm or establish {B, C, D, E, F}.
Read: Aquinas, The Five Ways; Leibniz, On the Ultimate Origination
AQUINAS, Saint Thomas (1225-74), Italy
AQUINAS' SECOND WAY (THE FIRST CAUSE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT)
P1. There are at present sensible things that cause and that are caused.
P2. Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself (nothing can self-cause itself).
P3. There cannot be an infinite regress of efficient causes.
_________
P4 Therefore, there is an uncaused first efficient cause. [from (P1) - (P3)]
P5. The name of God is the name of this uncaused first cause.
_________
C. Therefore, God exists. [Final conclusion, from (P4), and (P5)]
SOME COMMENTS
Premise #1: Aquinas believes that things around us did not always exist; their existence was brought about by something else (prior in time), whose existence was caused by something else (prior in time), and so on.Premise #4: Aquinas believes that there is something at the beginning of each causal series. This First Cause causes all elements in this series but which itself is not caused by anything prior in time.
Notice, Aquinas does not endorse or assert any of the following:
(?) God is a self-caused cause.
(??) Everything is caused.In addition, Aquinas must believe (some or all of) the following:
1. Every sensible thing is caused.
2. Every material thing is caused.
3. Every contingent thing is caused.
4. Every event is caused.(1) through (4) help to see what God is (and is not).
SOME OBJECTIONS
(P3) is unjustified. There are possible infinite series of causes; they do not require a starter. They did not get started, but they do exist because they always have existed.(P5) is unjustified.
A. This premise assumes that a first cause at the beginning of one causal chain is the very same entity as a first cause at the beginning of some other causal chain. That is, it assumes that there is exactly one first cause. (For the name God cannot denote several different things.) There is no reason to grant this assumption.B. Even if we granted that there is such a cause, nothing supports the claim that the first cause would have all the attributes of God.
LEIBNIZ'S COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
GOTTFRIED WILHELM VON LEIBNIZ, b. 1646, Leipzig, d. 1716, Hanover
Mathematician, theologian, philosopher, scientists (geologist, physicist, philologist), legal scholar, diplomat, historian, politician.
The Monadology; Discourse on Metaphysics; Theodicy; New Essays on Human Understanding; "On the Ultimate Origination of the Universe".Some Definitions:
- D1 x is a contingent being =def. x exists and it is possible that x does not exist.
- D2 x is a necessary being =def. it is not possible that x does not exist (x must exist; x exists necessarily).
- D3 x is the world =def. x is the aggregate consisting of every contingent thing that ever did exist, does now exist, or ever will exist.
- D4 x is independent of y =def. x and y have no common parts.
- D5 x is a sufficient reason for y =def. facts about x fully explain why y is as it is rather than otherwise.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason
PSR For every contingent thing, there is some independent sufficient reason.An Interpretation of Leibniz's Argument (from Sufficient Reason)
P1. The world exists and is contingent.
P2. If (P1), then there is some independent sufficient reason for the world. [by PSR]
P3. Thus, there is some independent sufficient reason for the world. [from (P1)&(P2)]
P4. If (P3) is true, then God exists.
_________
C. God exists. [From (P3), and (P4)]
Read: Mackie, Evil and Omnipotence; Sterba, Review of
Thomas; Testimony
Mark I. Vuletic, The
Tale of Five Officers
Additional: The
Evidential Problem of Evil (also, The
Logical Problem of Evil)
GOOD vs. EVIL (SOME DISTINCTIONS) (distinctions and quotes are based on The Evidential Problem of Evil)
An event may be categorized as evil if it involves any of the following:
1. some harm (whether it be minor or great) being done to the physical and/or psychological well-being of a sentient creature;
2. the unjust treatment of some sentient creature;
3. loss of opportunity resulting from premature death;
4. anything that prevents an individual from leading a fulfilling and virtuous life;
5. a person doing that which is morally wrong;
6. the ‘privation of good’.
An event may be categorized as good if it involves any of the following:
1. some improvement (whether it be minor or great) in the physical and/or psychological well-being of a sentient creature;
2. the just treatment of some sentient creature;
3. anything that advances the degree of fulfillment and virtue in an individual’s life;
4. a person doing that which is morally right;
5. the optimal functioning of some person or thing, so that it does not lack the full measure of being and goodness that ought to belong to it.
Moral evil. This is evil that results from the misuse of free will on the part of some moral agent in such a way that the agent thereby becomes morally blameworthy for the resultant evil. Moral evil therefore includes specific acts of intentional wrongdoing such as lying and murdering, as well as defects in character such as dishonesty and greed.
Natural evil. In contrast to moral evil, natural evil is evil that results from the operation of natural processes, in which case no human being can be held morally accountable for the resultant evil. Classic examples of natural evil are natural disasters such as cyclones and earthquakes that result in enormous suffering and loss of life, illnesses such as leukemia and Alzheimer’s, and disabilities such as blindness and deafness.
Horrendous evil: "the participation in which (that is, the doing or suffering of which) constitutes prima facie reason to doubt whether the participant’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to him/her on the whole” (Marilyn Adams (1999: 26). Some examples: “the rape of a woman and axing off of her arms, psycho-physical torture whose ultimate goal is the disintegration of personality, betrayal of one’s deepest loyalties, child abuse of the sort described by Ivan Karamazov, child pornography, parental incest, slow death by starvation, the explosion of nuclear bombs over populated areas” (p.26).
The case of Sue (in which a five-year-old girl in Flint, Michigan was severely beaten, raped and then strangled to death early on New Year’s Day in 1986. The case was introduced by Bruce Russell (1989: 123), whose account of it, drawn from a report in the Detroit Free Press of January 3 1986, runs as follows):
The girl’s mother was living with her boyfriend, another man who was unemployed, her two children, and her 9-month old infant fathered by the boyfriend. On New Year’s Eve all three adults were drinking at a bar near the woman’s home. The boyfriend had been taking drugs and drinking heavily. He was asked to leave the bar at 8:00 p.m. After several reappearances he finally stayed away for good at about 9:30 p.m. The woman and the unemployed man remained at the bar until 2:00 a.m. at which time the woman went home and the man to a party at a neighbor’s home. Perhaps out of jealousy, the boyfriend attacked the woman when she walked into the house. Her brother was there and broke up the fight by hitting the boyfriend who was passed out and slumped over a table when the brother left. Later the boyfriend attacked the woman again, and this time she knocked him unconscious. After checking the children, she went to bed. Later the woman’s 5-year old girl went downstairs to go to the bathroom. The unemployed man returned from the party at 3:45 a.m. and found the 5-year old dead. She had been raped, severely beaten over most of her body and strangled to death by the boyfriend
A SIMPLE ARGUMENT FROM EVIL
1. If God exists, then this world was created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (OO&O) being.
2. If this world was created by an OO&O being, then this world contains no evil.
3. This world contains some evil.
_________
4. Therefore, God does not exist. [from (1), (2), and (3)]
INADEQUATE REPLIES
The Mystery Reply: "God works in mysterious ways. Who are we to judge him?" Also, see The Tale of Five Officers.Evil is not a quality but a relation.
ALMOST ADEQUATE REPLIES
Evil is merely the privation of good (p. 121). A lack (or privation) of something is nothing at all. Thus, evil does not really exist. So, (3) is false.It is merely an illusion to think that there is evil.
ANOTHER LINE OF REPLIES (THERE IS EVIL BUT IT IS NOT POINTLESS)
There is no pointless or superfluous evil; that is, if there is any evil, there is a good reason for it, e.g., evil allows us to achieve some greater goods.In his Summa Teologica, Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225?-1274), observed the following:
Objection #1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist. (Part I, Question 2, Article 3).Aquinas did not think this is a good objection; he rejected it in the following passage:
"Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.It seems like Aquinas believes that it is inevitable or necessary that some goods come with some evils. That is, if those goods exist, something bad must also happen. So, the real question is not whether there is some evil, but rather whether there is pointless or superfluous evil; evil not necessary to achieve any greater or higher goods.
AN ARGUMENT FROM POINTLESS EVIL
1. If God exists, then this world was created by (OO&O) being.
2a. If this world was created by an OO&O being, then this world contains no pointless evil.
3a. This world contains some pointless evil.
_________
4. Therefore, God does not exist. [from (1), (2a), and (3a)]Principle About Pointless Evil: There is pointless (or superfluous) evil if and only if
1) something bad happens (there is something bad, there is some evil);
2) God could have created some reality such that this reality would contain at least as much good as our world; yet
3) this reality would not contain this evil.The idea is that if that the omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God would not permit any pointless (gratuitous , superfluous) evil, i.e., the evil that is (roughly speaking) avoidable, pointless, or unnecessary with respect to the fulfillment of God’s purposes.
A VIRTUE DEFENSE
See Mackie (pp. 124-125) and Leibniz (pp. 108-9):The existence of pain and disease (evils) makes possible the existence of sympathy, benevolence, heroism, etc (greater goods). These lesser evils must exist in order for greater goods to be possible.
FREE WILL DEFENSE
See Mackie (pp. 125-8):It is better for people to be Free, and sometimes bring about evil, than to be "innocent automata", i.e., not Free. God does not control people's actions and so is not responsible for the evil in the world.
The idea behind those lines of reply is that God must make a choice from among the following two alternatives:
- (a) there are no free beings (and there is nothing bad that is result of their actions); and
- (b) there are free beings and there are bad things that are results of their actions.
Because "Free Will" is such a great good, it seems like (b) is a much better option. The existence of free beings justifies the existence of evil those being cause. At least, that's the spirit of this reply.
But, suppose that someone replies to "Free Will Defense" suggesting yet another possibility:
- c) There are free beings but they never do anything bad.
It looks like many theists do not think that c) as a genuine possibility. They think that not even God could create truly free beings who never commit any error. So, not even God can bring this possibility about.
THE MANICHEAN REPLY
From Mani, a Persian of the 3rd century AD: God struggles with malevolent (evil) being. The malevolent being, and not God, is responsible for all the evil in the world.