• Instrumental: things which may be used as instruments to achieve something good/bad
• Intrinsic: things that are good/bad even when taken in themselves (and not simply because they lead to something good or bad)

THEORIES OF INTRINSIC VALUE

• Hedonism: Pleasure and only pleasure is intrinsically good. Pain and only pain is intrinsically bad.
  • Quantitative hedonism (Bentham): Only the amount of pleasure matters.
  • Qualitative hedonism (Mill): The quality of pleasure also matters.
• Eudaimonism: Happiness is intrinsically good.
• Desire satisfaction theories: What matters is the satisfaction of one's desires and wants.
• Pluralistic theories: There are several basic evils and goods; e.g.:
  • suffering, and pleasure
  • ignorance and knowledge
  • ugliness and beauty
  • premature death and conscious life
  • the loss of one's abilities and gain of abilities
  • the loss of freedom and gain of freedom

DUTIES

• Things (actions) one must do or must avoid doing

PERMISSIONS

• Normal permissions: things (actions) one can do (is allowed to do)
• Supererogations (ideals): Things (actions) that go beyond the call of duty; heroic or very difficult actions that cannot be required from everyone.

FUNDAMENTAL MORAL STANDARDS (PRINCIPLES)
Principles that underlie all particular requirements, permissions, prohibitions, etc.

• Example 1 (The Principle of Utility): An act, A, is morally right if and only if A maximizes social utility (i.e. the utility of all) (there must be no alternative the agent can do that has higher utility).
• Example 2 (Kantian Imperative): An act is morally right if and only if the agent does not treat any person merely as a means.

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CONSEQUENTIALISM

• CONSEQUENTIALISM: The moral status of a given action (i.e. whether this act is right or wrong, obligatory or forbidden, etc.) depends solely on the consequences of this action.
• DEONTOLOGY: The moral status of a given action depends solely on something other than the consequences of this action.

CLASSICAL UTILITARIANISM

MILL: "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded-namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain." (J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism")

UTILITARIANISM (U): An act, A, is morally right if and only if A maximizes social utility (i.e. the utility of all) (there must be no alternative the agent can do that has higher utility).

THE VALUE THEORY ASSUMED BY CLASSIC UTILITARIANS:

Mill: "Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure-no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit-they designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened; and modern holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assailants.

When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification. I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be included. But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, & c., of the former, that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. "

• Quantitative hedonism (Bentham): Only the amount of pleasure matters.
• Qualitative hedonism (Mill): The quality of pleasure also matters. 

If we combine a general Principle of Utility with Mill's account of intrinsic value, we have:

MILL'S UTILITARIANISM (U): An act, A, is morally right if and only if A maximizes social utility; that is, A promotes at least as much of a balance of happiness (pleasure) over unhappiness (pain)  as any alternative to A.

FEATURES (PROPERTIES) of CLASSICAL UTILITARIANISM

• Universal:  No one is excluded from possibly being included in utility calculations.
• Egalitarian:  Jeremy Bentham incorporate the essential component of moral equality by means of the formula, "Each to count for one and none for more than one."  Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) expressed the same idea in the following statement: "The good of any individual is of more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other. The main idea is that everyone is weighted the same in the utility calculations. Mary's happiness, for example, does not count any more or less than anyone else's.
• Consequential:  The utility of an action is determined by its consequences. Whether the action is right or wrong depends on the utility of this action in comparison with the utility of alternatives.
• Maximal: In each case, that action is right which maximizes utility. That is, utilitarians postulate that we always must aim at the best, nothing less is morally satisfactory.
• Hedonic: The sole intrinsic good is pleasure. The sole intrinsic evil is pain.
• Act-Evaluative (direct): Our utility-calculations only consider the consequences of actions (as opposed to, e.g., the utility of adopting a certain system of rules)

UTILITARIANISM MUST BE CONTRASTED WITH OTHER VERSIONS OF CONSEQUENTIALISM

Ayn Rand: "The ethics of altruism has created the image of the brute . . . in order to make men accept two inhuman tenets: (a) that any concern with one's own interests is evil, regardless of what these interests might be, and (b) that the brute's activities are in fact to one's own interest (which altruism enjoins man to renounce for the sake of his neighbors) . . .
Altruism declares that any action taken for the benefit of others is good, and any action taken for one's own benefit is evil. Thus the beneficiary of an action is the only criterion of moral value-and so long as that beneficiary is anybody other than oneself, anything goes . . . altruism permits no concept of a self-respecting.
The Objectivist ethics (of egoism) holds that the actor must always be the beneficiary of his action and that man must act for his own rational self-interest."

• ETHICAL EGOISM (EE): An act, A, is morally right if and only if A is in the best interest of the agent (the person who performs this act).
• RADICAL ETHICAL ALTRUISM (REA): An act, A, is morally right if and only if this act is in the best interest of people other than the agent.
  • A MATRIX OF INDIVIDUAL UTILITIES (an example)

    Alternatives \ Payoffs	Mark	Mary	Total
    Home	10	37	47
    Jazz	30	25	55
    Chess	25	5	30
    Poetry	35	15	50
    Movie	2	3	5

SOME OTHER CONSEQUENTIALIST  CONSIDERATIONS

EGALITARIANISM: Main idea: what ultimately matters is equality.

• Version 1 (the rule of law): The legal system is equally applicable to all people; no one is above or below the law.
• Version 2: Goods, harms, benefits, burdens and so on ought to be distributed equally. (this consideration does not require that we maximize utility.)

PARETO PRINCIPLE: It is always right to redistribute the goods in such a way that everyone benefits.

ANOTHER MATRIX (check also how to work with the matrix of utilities):

Alternatives \ Payoffs	John	.Jill.	.Dog.	.Cat.	.Agent	Others	.Total.
Study with Jill at John's	20	30	5	-2	.	.	.
Study with Jill at Jill's	30	25	-5	5	.	.	.
Study alone	15	15	5	5	.	.	.
Go to a concert	35	5	-5	-2	.	.	.
See a movie	25	5	-5	-2	.	.	.
Sleep whole day	8	7	5	5	.	.	.

THE BEST INTEREST PRINCIPLE: Act in the best interest of your clients (e.g., the patient).

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THE JUSTICE OBJECTION TO UTILITARIANISM
The central idea of this objection is that utilitarianism and justice are incompatible.

An Assumption: Some acts have the following features:

1. there are gravely unjust, e.g. they violate human rights, go contrary to our duties, etc. (===> hence, they are morally wrong)
2. yet, these gravely unjust acts maximize utility (===> hence, they are right by utilitarian standards)

An Argument against Utilitarianism:

1. If utilitarianism is true, then gravely unjust acts are morally right.
2. Gravely unjust acts are not right; they are morally wrong.
3. Therefore, utilitarianism is false. [from (1) and (2)]

Possible replies:

• Hidden alternatives.
• Hidden utilities (unforeseen consequences, long run consequences)
• Different Value theory.

UTILITARIANISM AND SUPEREROGATORY ACTS
The central idea of this objection is that utilitarianism is incompatible with there being any supererogatory acts.

1) If classical utilitarianism is true, then we always ought to do our best; nothing less than the best is ever permissible.
2) Sometimes we are not require to do our best; supererogatory acts are possible.
Therefore, 3)  classical utilitarianism is false. [from (1) and (2)]

UTILITARIAN EVALUATION OF ACTS

The factors that must be taken into account in a thorough utilitarian evaluation of the moral status (rightness/wrongness) of an action

• A) the short-term consequences of the action
• B) the long term consequences of the action
• C) the positive utility produces by the action
• D) the negative utility produced by the action
• E) the utility produced for everyone affected by this action
• F) how the utility the act produces compares to the utility produced by alternative actions

RULE UTILITARIANISM (INDIRECT UTILITARIANISM)

Step 1: Chose the best system of moral rules; this is the system that is the most beneficial (in a long run) for the society to adopt.
That is, chose the system of rules that, as a whole, maximizes utility

Step 2: Evaluate the actions in accordance with the system so chosen
That is, an action is right if it is in accordance with the system so chosen

The main idea, we ought to act in accordance with the rules even if and when, breaking a rule may maximize utility

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DEONTOLOGY

ROSS'S SYSTEM OF PRIMA FACIE DUTIES (RD):

KANT'S IMPERATIVES

• The Formula of Universal (Moral) Law
• The Formula of Respect

RIGHTS GROUNDED THEORIES (RR)

• Negative right
• Positive rights

ROSS'S SYSTEM OF PRIMA FACIE DUTIES (RD)

An action, A, is morally right if and only if (iff) no alternative to this action is a more stringent prima facie duty.

"I suggest ‘prima facie duty' or ‘conditional duty' as a brief way of referring to the characteristic... which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g., the keeping of a promise)... Whether an act is a duty proper or an actual duty depends on all morally significant kinds it is an instance of" (Ross: The Right and the Good, pp. 19-20). 

THE MAIN KINDS OF PRIMA FACIE DUTIES

1. Fidelity
2. Reparation
3. Gratitude
4. Justice
5. Beneficence
6. Self-improvement
7. Non-maleficence

KANT'S IMPERATIVE(S) -- FORMULA OF UNIVERSAL (MORAL) LAW

Kant believes that actions are not merely bodily movement -- to use an example, blinking is not the same thing as winking. What distinguishes actions from mere bodily movement is their intentionality. When we act, we think of what we do in general terms. For example, right now

• I write
• I telling the truth
• I am teaching students

Kant thinks that, when we evaluate whether action is right or wrong, we may have in mind one of two things.

• (A) We may wonder whether or not the action is an efficient way to achieve a certain goal.
• (B)  We may wonder whether the action is good (or right) even when taken in itself.

As he observes:

"The hypothetical imperative, therefore, says only that the action is good to some purpose, possible or actual. In the former case it is a problematical, in the latter an assertorical, practical principle. The categorical imperative, which declares the action to be of itself objectively necessary without making any reference to a purpose, i.e., without having any other end, holds as an apodictical (practical) principle.... " (Immanuel Kant, "The Categorical Imperative")

Thus, Kant distinguishes two kinds of imperatives:

• Hypothetical Imperatives link actions with a desirable goal.
• Categorical Imperative asserts that some actions are absolutely and unconditionally necessary. (We might say that Kant idea is that we can determine that some action is morally desirable (or right), when we consider what kind of action it is

Kant asserts that there is only one categorical imperative, and that all moral duties can be inferred from this imperative:

"if I think of a categorical imperative, I know immediately what it contains. For since the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity of the maxim of acting in accordance with this law. while the law contains no condition to which it is restricted, there is nothing remaining in it except the universality of law as such to which the maxim of the action should conform; and in effect this conformity alone is represented as necessary by the imperative.
There is, therefore, only one categorical imperative. It is: Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. "  (Immanuel Kant, "The Categorical Imperative")

Let us state Kant's idea in the form:

(KI1) An act is morally right if and only if this act is based on a maxim (or a subjective principle of will) that may become universal (moral) law (that you may rationally will to become such a law).

To see how this principle is supposed to work, think that maxims are subjective rules that actually motivate a person. Generalized maxims are principles that we achieve by eliminating all references to individuals. Here are some examples:

MAXIMS ("subjective" rules)	GENERALIZATIONS (objective rules)
I will lie when I'm tempted to lie.	Everyone will lie when one is tempted to lie.
I will keep change when I can get away with this.	Everyone will keep change when one can do this.
I will break my word when it's beneficial for me.	One will break one's word when it's beneficial for her.

Imagine now that someone considers a certain action. This person must consider his or her maxim. Then she needs to consider a generalized form of this maxim. Finally, she has to determine this generalized maxim can becomes a moral rule in a society. That is, she or he must consider what would happen when everyone acted on the same maxim. Can we rationally will (want) that everyone follows the same rule?

• If YES ===> his or her action (based on this maxim) is morally right.
• If NO ===> his or her action (based on this maxim) is morally wrong.

Consider Kant's example #2: "Another man finds himself forced by need to borrow money. He well knows that he will not be able to repay it, but he also sees that nothing will be loaned him if he does not firmly promise to repay it at a certain time. He desires to make such a promise, but he has enough conscience to ask himself whether it is not improper and opposed to duty to relieve his distress in such a way. Now, assuming he does decide to do so, the maxim of his action would be as follows: When I believe myself to be in need of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know I shall never do so. Now this principle of self-love or of his own benefit may very well be compatible with his whole future welfare, but the question is whether it is right. He changes the pretension of self-love into a universal law and then puts the question: How would it be if my maxim became a universal law? He immediately sees that it could never hold as a universal law of nature and be consistent with itself; rather it must necessarily contradict itself. For the universality of a law which says that anyone who believes himself to be in need could promise what he pleased with the intention of not fulfilling it would make the promise itself and the end to be accomplished by it impossible; no one would believe what was promised to him but would only laugh at any such assertion as vain pretense."

A person in Kant's example acts on the following maxim:

(Max) When I believe myself to be in need of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know I shall never do so.

The generalization of this maxim goes as follows:

(GenMax) Anyone who believes himself to be in need could promise what he pleased with the intention of not fulfilling.

Kant now asks whether (GenMax) can become the universal moral law for a society. He thinks that it cannot. For, if (GenMax) were adopted, no one would believe any promising. So, no one could borrow money by making a false promise.

PROBLEMS FOR KANT

MAXIMS ("subjective" rules)	GENERALIZATIONS (objective rules)
I will never be the first to arrive at a party.	No one ever be the first to arrive at a party.
I will never be the last to leave a party	No one ever be the last to leave a party.

Actions based on these maxims are morally innocent (permissible). But I cannot rationally will that the generalized maxims become moral rules. So, (K1) implies that my actions are wrong.

KANT'S SECOND IMPERATIVE -- THE FORMULA OF RESPECT

Kant asserts also what follows: "...man and, in general, every rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. In all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, he must always be regarded at the same time as an end . . .
The ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily thinks of his own existence in this way; thus far it is a subjective principle of human actions. Also every other rational being thinks of his existence by means of the same rational ground which holds also for myself, thus it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. The practical imperative, therefore, is the following: Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only. " (Immanuel Kant, "The Categorical Imperative")

We can extract from this passage the second formulation of categorical imperative:

(KI2) An act is morally right iff the agent does not treat anyone (any person) merely as a means but also as an end in itself.

Important things to remember

• Treating someone as a means is not the same thing as treating someone merely as a means.
• Kant is not very clear what it means to treat someone merely as a means (as opposed to, as a means and also as an end in itself).

  A "HARM" INTERPRETATION OF KANTIAN ETHICS

  • X treats Y merely as a means if X harms (or hurts) Y.
    X does not treat Y merely as a means if X benefits Y (or at least does not harm/hurt) Y

    A PROBLEM: Sometimes we harm a well informed volunteer. In such a case, our action is not wrong (as this interpretation implies).

  A "RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY" INTERPRETATION OF KANTIAN ETHICS

  • X treats Y merely as a means if X does not respect autonomy of Y.
    X does not treat Y merely as a means if X respects autonomy of Y.

  SOME PROBLEMS RELATED TO RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY
  In general, we respect one's autonomy if we act in accordance with his or her evaluations.

  AN "EXPLICIT CONSENT" INTERPRETATION OF RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY

  • X treats Y merely as a means if Y does/did not explicitly consent to this treatment.
    X does not treat Y merely as a means if Y explicitly consents to this treatment.
    • A PROBLEM: We do not consent to some forms of "emergency" treatment; they do not require any explicit consent.
    • A FURTHER PROBLEM: Sometimes we do have an explicit consent and yet the action is wrong (the consent is not rational). 

  AN "INFORMED CONSENT" OF KANTIAN ETHICS

  X treats Y merely as a means iff Y does not give rational and informed consent to this treatment.

  AN INFORMED CONSENT:
  Consent given after full disclosure of risks, benefits, and alternative treatments to any proposed procedure; such consent would be autonomous.

  AN "INFORMED HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT" INTERPRETATION OF AUTONOMY

   X treats Y merely as a means if Y would not rationally consent to this treatment, if Y were well informed.

  X does not treat Y merely as a means if Y would rationally consents to this treatment, if Y were well informed.

  TWO LEVEL VIEW

  • Clear cut cases: we base the decisions on informed hypothetical consent
  • Hard cases: when it is not clear whether Y would consent or not (e.g., Y can be seriously harmed, there are serious risks involved, etc)…
    we require that Y gives an explicit and rational consent to some treatment or else Y is treated merely as a means

  SOME PROBLEMS

  • Would a burglar to our calling police (see Gert, "Morality vs. Slogans")?
  • Would a criminal not consent to being sent to jail? Would an enemy consent to being spied upon?

RIGHTS GROUNDED THEORIES (RR)

An act is morally right if and only if the act does not violate any rights.

There is a difference between negative and positive rights.

X is a negative right iff X is a right not to be interfered with.
X is a positive right iff X is a right to receive some benefits.
Negative rights are correlated with negative obligations or duties.
Positive rights are correlated with positive obligations or duties. 

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